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Abstract
In recent years, a growing number of authors have turned their focus
to the question of why children work. While much of the research focuses
on household level factors, macroeconomic factors have gained increasing
attention. This is particularly true in the case of globalization. The
purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on the role of
globalization in child labor by examining a specic aspect of globalization:
social globalization. The results of the empirical analysis indicate that
social globalization does have a signicant impact on the average incidence
of child labor in the cross-country sample of developing countries.
Key words: child labor, social globalization, norms
JEL Classication: J20; O11.
1 Introduction
Research into the topic of child labor has experienced a signicant upswing in
the past two decades. Yet despite this increased attention, child labor remains
a signicant problem in many parts of the world. According to recent estimates
by the International Labour Organization (ILO), there were approximately 176
million children between the ages of ve and fourteen in employment in 2008,
of which roughly 53 million were participating in hazardous work (Diallo et al,
2010).
In order to reduce the incidence of child labor in the world, it is necessary
to understand its root causes. The existing body of theoretical and empirical
research into the topic of child labor reveals that child labor is a multifaceted
problem, and that a number of factors contribute to the decision to send a child
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to work1 . The majority of the literature has focused on the factors that are
relevant at the level of the household when attempting to explain child labor,
such as subsistence poverty and credit constraints. In recent years, however,
growing attention has been paid to the role of macroeconomic factors, such as
economic growth, income inequality, and in particular economic globalization.
Indeed, as the globalization debate in general has gained momentum, interest
in the inuence of international trade and foreign direct investment on the in-
cidence of child labor. This paper contributes to the growing body of literature
examining the relationship between globalization and child labor by examining
another aspect of globalization, namely social globalization. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the only study that explicitly examines the relationship be-
tween social globalization and child labor. Like the term globalization itself,
the term "social globalization" is somewhat indistinct, with no one universally
accepted denition. For the purpose of this paper, I will delineate social glob-
alization along the same lines as the KOF Index of Globalization, i.e. social
globalization is meant to capture the international spread of information, ideas
and people (Dreher, 2006). There are two potential channels through which so-
cial globalization might impact child labor. One is the spread of (international)
norms, where the hypothesis is that greater exposure to international norms will
lead to a lower acceptance for child labor and/or a greater preference for school-
ing, and will therefore be negatively related with child labor. This hypothesis
is related to an older body of literature on the impact of international norms
on a range of political and socioeconomic outcomes. The second hypothesis is
that increased social globalization will increase the schooling by expanding the
potential labor market for skilled labor, which would have the e¤ect of increas-
ing the demand for schooling and decrease the incidence of child labor. This
hypothesis relates to the existing literature on international migration and edu-
cational attainment. Finally, social globalization is also related to the research
into the impact of information and communications technology (ICT) on various
aspects of development (see for example United Nations, 2005).
The relationship between child labor and social globalization is analyzed
empirically for children ages 7 to 14 using cross-country data from the Un-
derstanding Childrens Work program. In keeping with much of the previous
cross-country research, the sample is limited to developing countries, which gives
a maximum sample size of 86 countries. The results indicate that there is a sig-
1See Basu (1999) and Congdon Fors (2012), for example, for surveys of the theoretical and
empirical research into the causes of child labor.
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nicant negative relationship between social globalization and child labor. This
relationship is robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables, includ-
ing the log of per capita GDP and variables capturing the composition of the
economy. The signicant and negative relationship persists when using an older
and larger data set collected by the International Labour Organization (2000),
and when applying instrumental variable estimation to the original data set. It
is not possible, however, to distinguish the exact channel through which social
globalization a¤ects child labor.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides
some denitions and background as to the extent of child labor in various regions
of the world, as well as the distribution by sector. Section 3 reviews the existing
literature on the relationship between economic globalization and child labor,
and explores the channels through which social globalization can be expected
to inuence child labor. The rst two categories focus on constraints faced by
the household that may induce them to send their children to work. The third
category deals with market imperfections that can lead to increased incentive to
send children to work, while the fourth category deals primarily with the issue
of agency. The role of gender and fertility are also briey highlighted at the
end of the section. Section four describes the data to be used in the empirical
analysis and presents the general empirical model, while section ve presents
the results of the empirical analysis, including robustness checks. Section six
concludes the paper.
2 Child Labor: Denitions and Background
The terms "child work", "child labor" and "economically active children" are of-
ten used interchangeably in the literature. The ILO, however, categorizes three
types of working children: children in employment, child laborers, and children
in hazardous work. The category "children in employment" is the broadest of
the three categories and includes all types of paid productive activity as well as
certain types of non-paid productive activity. Examples of the latter are pro-
ductions of goods for own (household) use or domestic work outside the childs
own household. Domestic work performed within the childs own household
does not, however, count as economic activity. Further, the denition of eco-
nomic activity is not conned to legal activities, but also encompasses illegal
activities. The category "child laborer" is more restrictive than the previous
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category, excluding certain types of children in employment. Children who are
older than age 11 and only work a few hours in light work are not considered
to be child laborers, where light work by denition does not interfere with the
childs ability to attend school or vocational training. Further, children over the
age of 14 who are not engaged in hazardous work are excluded from this cate-
gory. Finally, "hazardous work" is dened as work that has or leads to risks for
the children engaged in these activities. Risks include the childs safety, moral
development, physical and mental health. More detailed denitions of the dif-
ferent categories of working children, including the relevant ILO conventions,
can be found for example in Diallo et al (2010).
According to the most recent ILO statistics on child labor, 14.5 percent of
children aged ve to fourteen participated in some form of work in 2008. This
amounts to 176 million children worldwide. The majority of these children,
roughly 96 million, are located in Asia and the Pacic, while sub-Saharan Africa,
with 58 million working children, has the second largest incidence. Indeed, these
two regions alone account for almost 90 percent of all child labor. It is perhaps
unsurprising that Asia and the Pacic has the greatest population of working
children given that this is the most populous region of the world in general.
However, the Asia-Pacic region also exhibits a slightly higher participation
rate than the worldwide average, with 14.8 percent of children participating in
work. This activity rate is second only to that of sub-Saharan Africa, where a
staggering 28.4 percent of children calculated as being employed (Diallo et al,
2010).
A common perception is that most child laborers work for wages in the formal
sector, conjuring images of children working long hours in sweatshops or toiling
away in mines. As a result, consumer boycotts and trade sanctions against
products using child labor as an input are often discussed as means of reducing
the incidence of child labor. In reality, however, such methods may have little
impact for several reasons. Firstly, the majority of working children are active in
the agricultural or services sectors, with only an estimated 7 percent of working
children active in the industry sector (ILO, 2006; Diallo et al, 2010). Secondly,
very few children work for wages outside the home; according to statistics from
2000, less than 3 percent of children worked for wages outside of the home, while
just over 5 percent performed unpaid work outside of the home (Edmonds and
Pavcnik, 2005a). As a result, the majority of child laborers will not be a¤ected
by boycotts and trading sanctions. Further, children working in the a¤ected
sectors may simply relocate to an una¤ected sector. Similarly, an outright ban
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on child labor would in most cases be di¢ cult, if not impossible, to enforce and
as such would likely to have little e¤ect on the overall incidence of child labor.
In the worst case, a ban could end up making some children signicantly worse
o¤ if these children are compelled to work in order to keep themselves and their
families out of extreme poverty. For these reasons, there is a general scepticism
in the literature over the e¢ cacy of policies such as consumer boycotts and
import bans (Maskus, 1997; Basu and Zarghamee, 2009; Doepke and Zilibotti,
2009, 2010)2 .
For the remainder of this paper, I will use the terms "child labor", "working
children" and "economically active children" interchangeably.
3 Globalization and Child Labor
3.1 Economic globalization and child labor
The existing literature on the relationship between globalization and child la-
bor has focused on economic aspects of globalization, namely international trade
and foreign direct investment (FDI). From a theoretical point of view, the e¤ect
of international trade and FDI on child labor is ambiguous; international trade
may either increase or decrease child labor. If an increase in international trade
increases per capita income then it is expected to reduce child labor. However,
international trade may also increase the demand for unskilled labor, which
would tend to increase the incidence of child labor (Davies and Voy, 2009). Fur-
ther, the e¤ect of an increase in the price of export goods produced with child
labor as an input is also ambiguous, and depends on the magnitude of income
and substitution e¤ects (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005b). Therefore, determin-
ing the net e¤ect of international trade on child labor has been primarily an
empirical question.
The majority of the existing empirical literature uses cross-country data
measuring the percent of children aged 1014 in a country that are economi-
cally active as the dependent variable. This data is collected by the International
Labour Organization (ILO). One of the earliest studies, Cigno et al (2002), uses
panel data to nd the impact of trade and openness on child labor. Trade is
measured in terms of ows (imports + exports as a percentage of GDP) and
2This is not to say that bans are never motivated; clearly a ban on illegal and hazardous
activities is desirable. However, additional policy instruments are necessary in order to e¤ec-
tively combat child labor.
5
openness is measured by the binary measure of openness to trade put forth
by Sachs and Warner (1995). Their results show that openness and interna-
tional trade either slightly reduce child labor or have no e¤ect, depending on
the specication of the model. Similarly, Neumayer and De Soysa (2005) nd
that trade openness (as measured by imports + exports as a percentage of GDP)
and FDI (measured by the stock of FDI as a percentage of GDP) reduce child
labor in their cross-country data set, even when controlling for per capita GDP.
Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006) use instrumental variables to control for the po-
tential endogeneity of trade openness (again measured in terms of ows), and
nd that there is a negative relationship between trade and child labor in their
cross-country data. However, this relationship is driven by the fact that trade
and national income are positively correlated; when per capita GDP is included
in the regression the positive e¤ect of trade disappears. Davies and Voy (2009)
also employ instrumental variables to explore the link between FDI (measured
as net investment inow), international trade (measured as trade ows) and
child labor. They nd a negative relationship between both FDI and child la-
bor and trade and child labor in the cross-country data; however, these results
become insignicant when national income is controlled for. In all of these cases,
international trade and FDI per se do not seem to play a signicant role in child
labor; the e¤ect runs rather through the positive relationship between national
income and trade/FDI. However, international trade and FDI are not shown to
increase child labor, either. Finally, the work of Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005b)
are an exception to the literature reviewed above, as the data set is not cross-
country but rather a ve year panel of household data from Vietnam. They
nd that trade liberalization leads to an increase in the export price of rice, and
that this price e¤ect leads to a signicant decline in child labor, particularly in
households that are large net exporters of rice.
3.2 Social globalization and child labor
The results of the research reviewed in the previous sub-section indicate that
economic globalization does not have a signicant impact in any direction on
child labor measured in cross-country data. The question this paper aims to
address is whether another measure of globalization, namely social globalization,
may have an impact on the incidence of child labor. Social globalization, like
the term globalization in general, is di¢ cult to dene precisely. However, for
the purpose of this paper, the concept of social globalization will be primarily
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focused on the social integration aspect of globalization, such as the transfer of
information and personal contacts across national borders. Research on social
globalization per se is quite recent; however, there are studies showing that social
globalization (KOF measure) has an e¤ect on diverse socioeconomic phenomena
such as corruption (Charron, 2009), life expectancy (Bergh and Nilsson, 2010a),
income inequality (Bergh and Nilsson, 2010b), and human rights (Dreher et
al, 2011), to name a few. Further, the current research on social globalization
is related to an older and larger literature on the role of (international) norm
transmission in areas such as corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Sandholtz and
Gray, 2003), income inequality (Atkinson, 1997), decolonization and human
rights (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), the use of land mines (Price, 1998),
diet and obesity (Mendez and Popkin, 2004), and primary education (Lloyd et
al, 2000; Huisman and Smits, 2009). Further, social norms have been shown
to a¤ect adoption of new technology (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006) and levels
of fertility (Krishnan, 2001). Turning to child labor specically, López-Calva
(2001) develops a model where social norms a¤ect how acceptable child labour
is considered, while Patrinos and Shaq (2010) explore the case where parents
might even have a positive attitude towards child labor. In a related vein,
Andvig (2001) argues that the economy could become more e¢ cient if gender
norms were changed. Therefore, social globalization could play a role in reducing
child labor if norms against child labor or in favor of schooling are transmitted
via greater international integration and transactions.
Another possibility is that social globalization may reduce child labor by
increasing the returns to schooling and hence increasing the opportunity cost
of child labor. For example, there is an emerging literature that investigates
the role of international migration on educational attainment. The idea is that
if globalization facilitates international migration, then this in turn leads to
the potential for higher returns to education. In this case, it is possible that
the average level of education even among non-migrants in the home country
will rise in response to greater globalization (Stark, 2004; Mayr and Peri, 2009;
Iranzo and Peri, 2009). Further, social globalization may also correlate with the
costs of skills acquisition; i.e. increased international contacts may facilitate the
acquisition of skills that are valued on a global market (Shastry, 2008). In these
cases, social globalization will work to increase the returns to education, which
in turn increase the opportunity cost of child labor.
A simple model illustrating potential channels through which social global-
ization may a¤ect the incidence of child labor is presented in Appendix A.
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4 Data specication and general empirical model
4.1 Dependent variable
As mentioned above, the main source of cross-country data on child labor used
in previous research has been taken from the ILO (2000). The main advantage
of this data is that it provides a measure of child labor across a large number
of countries over several years. The data is based on household survey data
that is adjusted to make it comparable between countries and over time. This
last aspect reects the fact that the surveys were conducted in di¤erent years
for di¤erent countries. There are, however, some limitations with the data.
Perhaps the most prominent of these is the fact that the data in many countries
relies to a large extent on estimations, projections and imputations due to a
lack of available survey data (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2006; Neumayer and De
Soysa, 2005). Further, the measure is restricted to children 10 - 14 years old,
which excludes a potentially large and important number of economically active
children. The child labor statistics include all working children and does not
distinguish between those who only work and those who both work and attend
school. Finally, the data does not include the number of children preforming
domestic work in their own household, thereby excluding a potentially large
number of child workers. This last limitation is common to many measures of
child labor and depends to a large extent on the fact that most denitions of
child labor do not include such activities. A practical limitation of the data is
that it is no longer being updated in its previous form; the most recent year of
data used in the previous literature is 1995.
More recent data on child labor come from the Understanding Childrens
Work (UCW) program, which is a research cooperation program involving the
ILO, UNICEF and the World Bank. The UCW was formed in response to
increased international focus on the problem of child labor and the need for
more statistics and empirical research on the subject (UCW, 2012). The UCW
database contains data on child labor from nearly 100 countries and exhibits
certain advantages over the previous ILO data. To start with, the UCW data
covers child labor statistics for children from 7 - 14 years of age, rather than
from10 - 14 years of age. Further, the data can in most cases be disaggregated
into children who work only and children who both work and attend school.
Finally, the data covers more recent years than the previous ILO data. The
main disadvantage with the data is that not all surveys are from the same year
8
but rather range from 1994 to 2007, and have not been adjusted to account
for this. However, given the advantages of the UCW data over the older ILO
data, I choose to use the UCW data as the dependent variable for the baseline
regressions, while the ILO data will be used as a robustness check. The UCW
data on child labor is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators (2011)
database while the ILO data from 1995 is taken from Neumayer and De Soysa
(2005).
4.2 Independent variables
The measure of social globalization used in this paper is the social globalization
component of the KOF Index of Globalization, developed by Dreher (2006).3
The index runs from 1 to 100 and is a measure of social contacts and informa-
tion ows, and includes such factors as outgoing telephone tra¢ c, number of
internet users and international tourism (see Appendix B for a more detailed
description). The social globalization is meant to reect how socially integrated
a country is with the rest of the world, and to a certain extent measures the
potential exposure of a given country to international norms. As argued above,
social globalization is expected to be negatively related to child labor via either
norms transmission or increased returns to education. The relationship between
social globalization and child labor in the raw UCW data is displayed in gure
1 and exhibits a negative slope. Further, the gure 1 illustrates that there is
a great deal of variation in both social globalization and child labor in the raw
data.
<Figure 1 about here>
Social globalization is, however, likely highly correlated with other economic
variables, which need to be accounted for. One factor that is often highlighted
in both the theoretical and empirical research on child labor is poverty. In-
deed, there is empirical evidence of a link between rising national income and
a decrease in the incidence of child labor, but once a certain level of national
a­ uence is attained, the relationship between national income and child labor
weakens substantially (Basu, 1999; Fallon and Tzannatos, 1998). This may be
due to distributional considerations, i.e. income inequality may o¤set many of
the gains from a higher overall GDP. However, in the absence of standardized
cross-country measures of poverty, national income is often used as a proxy
measure for poverty. Therefore, I include the natural log of per capital PPP
3The KOF index was subsequently updated by Dreher et al (2008).
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GDP as an independent variable in the analysis, with the data taken from the
World Development Indicators database (WDI, 2011). The baseline regression
for the empirical analysis will therefore be:
EACi = 0 + 1SocialGlobalizationi + 2 ln(pcGDPi) + "i (1)
where SocialGlobalizationi is social globalization in country i, ln(pcGDPi) is
the log of per capita GDP in country i and "i is the normally distributed error
term.
It is not straightforward that an increase in national income in and of itself
is responsible for the decline in child labor force participation; other factors
correlated with economic development may play a determining role. A shift in
production from predominately agricultural to manufacturing, developments in
political and legal institutions, increased access and higher returns to education
and changes in social norms may all contribute to a reduction in child labor.
The structure of production in an economy is a factor that has been found to
have a signicant impact on the incidence of child labor. Fallon and Tzannatos
(1998) point out that the share of agriculture in GDP has a stronger positive
relationship to the incidence of child labor than GDP taken by itself and as such
may serve as a more accurate predictor of child labor. Similarly, Andvig (2001)
nds a weak relationship between GDP and child labor participation rates in
Africa, while the relationship between child labor participation and the per-
centage of the population in rural areas is signicantly positive. Therefore, the
percentage of the population living in rural areas is included as an independent
variable, along with variables measuring value added as a percentage of GDP
in the agricultural and service sectors. The data for all three of these variables
is taken from the WDI database.
A measure of a countrys political institutions is also included as a control
variable, in this case the Freedom House measure of Political Rights which ranges
from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic) (Freedom House, 2010). The
data is taken from the QoG database (Teorell et al, 2011). Ideally, one would
like to include a measure of the quality and e¢ ciency of the school system
in the analysis, but such data is generally unavailable. Therefore, education
expenditures as a percentage of GNI is included as an independent variable as
a proxy for access to education. This data is taken from the WDI database
(WDI, 2011).
Controls for the geographic region that a country is located in are included
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in the regressions. This is done to help control for unobserved characteristics
of countries that may be correlated with geography. Additionally, a dummy
variable indicating whether or not the country is a signatory of the ILO child
labor convention 138, which stipulates the minimum age of employment, is
included as an additional control in some regressions. Finally, dummy variables
indicating the year in which the data was observed are included to account for
the fact that the child labor surveys were undertaken in di¤erent years. The
resulting regression is thus:
EACi = 0 + 1SocialGlobalizationi + 2 ln(pcGDPi) + 3Xi + "i (2)
where Xi is a vector of the control variables listed above. The UCW data
contains only one OECD country (Portugal). Therefore, in keeping with much
of the previous literature, I restrict the sample to non-OECD countries4 .
5 Results
Table 1 shows the correlation coe¢ cients between economically active children,
social globalization, log per capita GDP, and selected control variables of in-
terest. All of the correlation coe¢ cients between the dependent variable and
independent variables have the expected sign. Further, all coe¢ cients are sig-
nicant at the one percent level, with the exception of political rights, which
is signicant at the ve percent level, and C138, which is insignicant. The
variables most highly correlated with child labor are social globalization, value
added in agriculture, and log per capita GDP. Table 1 also reveals that many
of the independent variables are highly correlated with each other.
<Table 1 about here>
5.1 Economically active children
Table 2 presents the regression results for the baseline model and control vari-
ables, using the data from the UCW program. The dependent variable is eco-
nomically active children ages 7 to 14 as percentage of all children ages 7 to 14.
This measure includes all children who work, regardless if they combine work
with school or only work. All regressions include dummy variables to control
4 Including Portugal in the regressions does not change the results substantially.
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for the year the data was collected and a constant, but these results are not
reported. Column (1) shows the results from estimating equation (1), where
only social globalization and log per capita GDP are included as independent
variables. As expected, both social globalization and log per capital GDP are
signicantly and negatively related to child labor. Further, social globalization
is more signicantly related to child labor than national income, both in terms
of statistical and economic signicance. A one standard deviation increase in
social globalization decreases child labor by 8,24 percentage points (slightly less
than a half standard deviation) while a one standard deviation increase in log
per capital GDP decreases child labor by 4,94 percentage points (just over a
quarter of a standard deviation). In column (2), regional dummy variables are
included in the regression to potentially capture unobservable country charac-
teristics correlated with geography (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2006). The results
for social globalization remain qualitatively unchanged, while the coe¢ cient on
log per capita GDP is reduced by more than half and rendered insignicant.
Therefore, social globalization once again appears to play a signicant role in
national levels of child labor.
<Table 2 about here>
In column (3), variables measuring the composition of the economy are in-
cluded in the regression. The rst of these variables is the rural population as
a percentage of the total population, while the other two are value added as a
percentage of GDP in the agricultural and service sectors, respectively. While
the correlation between rural population and value added in agriculture is fairly
high (0.5445), it is clear that these two variables are not measuring exactly the
same phenomena. Here I choose to include rural population and value added in
agriculture in the same regression, as the rural population variable may reect
access to public goods as well more traditional norms and values (López-Calva,
2001), while value added in agriculture more directly captures the structure of
the economy and potential demand for child labor.5 The results show that of
these three additional variables, only value added in agriculture is statistically
signicant, exhibiting a positive relationship with child labor. Social globaliza-
tion becomes slightly less statistically signicant but retains the same economic
signicance as in column (1), while per capita GDP remains insignicant.
Column (4) reports the results when political variables are added to the re-
gression. More specically, a measure of a countrys political rights is included
5 Including these variables separately in the regression does not lead to a qualitative change
the in results.
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as a proxy for domestic political institutions, along with a variable indicat-
ing whether the country is a signatory of the ILO child labor convention 138.
Neither of these variables are signicant in the regression, while the result for
social globalization and the other control variables are qualitatively una¤ected.
Finally, column (5) includes a variable measuring education expenditures as a
percentage of GNI. This variable is intended as a proxy for access to education
in a given country, but is insignicant in the regression. Social globalization
remains signicant, albeit at a slightly lower level of signicance. Indeed, the
only variable to remain signicant in all ve regressions is social globalization.
Value added in agriculture is the only other signicant variable, although the
variable becomes insignicant in the last regression. Therefore, the results in
table 2 indicate that social globalization is signicantly related to child labor in
the cross-country sample.
5.2 Economically active children by gender
The child labor data from the UCW project is also available by gender. Table
3 reports the results when the regressions from table 2 are run for economically
active boys and economically active girls separately. A comparison of the results
across all regressions reveals that in general there is little di¤erence in the inu-
ence of the independent variables on child labor in the boyssample versus the
girlssample. One exception to this is value added in agriculture, which has a
consistently signicant e¤ect on boyslabor but is only signicant in one regres-
sion of the girlssample. Further, the economic e¤ects of social globalization are
somewhat larger in the case of boyslabor versus girlslabor. In column (1), the
economic e¤ects are almost identical: a one standard deviation increase in so-
cial globalization decreases child labor by approximately 8.2 percentage points,
which is just under one half standard deviation. However, as more control vari-
ables are added to the regressions, the economic e¤ects of social globalization
increase in the case of boys and decrease in the case of girls. There are fewer
economically active girls on average, which is in line with previous studies. As
mentioned above, the denition of economically active children does not include
own household domestic activities, which is where many girls are active. In this
respect, the numbers are somewhat misleading if one is interested in the number
of children participating in non-school activities.
<Table 3 about here>
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5.3 Economically active children, work only
The dependent variable in table 2 includes children who both work and attend
school and children who work exclusively. In this subsection the dependent vari-
able is economically active children who only work. There is some evidence that
child labor and schooling can be compliments rather than substitutes (children
use the extra income from their labor in order to attend school, for example), in
which case it is not straightforward that child labor is unambiguously harmful
for the child. Therefore, children who only work is arguably a more relevant
group to investigate, as these children presumably do not receive any schooling
at all6 .
<Table 4 about here>
The regression results reported in table 4 are qualitatively very similar to
the results in the previous subsections. Value added in agriculture, however,
is somewhat more signicant in the case of children who work only compared
to the group of all working children. Further, expenditures on education are
signicantly and negatively related to the percentage of children who work only.
Therefore, it may be the case that an increase in education expenditures im-
proves access to schooling but that it rst and foremost leads to some children
combining school and work, rather than leading children to abandon child labor
altogether (given the insignicant result in column (5) in table 2). In all cases,
the relationship between social globalization and the percentage of children who
work only is signicant and negative. The economic e¤ect of social globalization
in column (1) is qualitatively similar to the results in column (1) of table 2, i.e. a
one standard deviation increase in social globalization decreases the percentage
of children participating in work only by approximately 5.5 percentage points,
which is just under one half of the standard deviation. Finally, one region stands
out in terms of children who work only: the coe¢ cient on sub-Saharan Africa
signicant and positive in two of the regressions. This results seems to be driven
to a large extent by access to education (column (5)).
5.4 Robustness checks
As mentioned above, the UCW data has a number of advantages over the previ-
ous ILO data. However, the fact that the UCW data is not adjusted to account
for the fact that the surveys are from di¤erent years can be problematic. Further,
6Reference to papers that show a short term gain but longer term loss.
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the ILO data is available for more countries than the UCW data. Therefore,
I choose to run the regressions from section 5.1 using the ILO data as the de-
pendent variable. For the sake of comparison, I again restrict the sample to
developing countries. As previously explained, the ILO data is limited to chil-
dren aged 10 to 14, whereas the UCW data is limited to children aged 7 to 14.
Therefore, the results are not directly comparable, but should in any case give
an indication as to whether they are consistent with the results in section 5.1.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between economically active children and social
globalization. In contrast to gure 1, there are a number of countries now in-
cluded which do not report having any economically active children, resulting in
a nonlinear relationship between social globalization and child labor. Therefore,
the regressions presented below include a squared value of social globalization
to account for this nonlinearity7 .
<Figure 2 about here>
<Table 5 about here>
Table 5 reports the results of the regressions when the dependent variable
is the percentage of economically active children aged 10 to 14 in the year
1995. In column (1), social globalization is signicantly and negatively related
to child labor, while the quadratic of social globalization is signicant and posi-
tive. Therefore, the positive e¤ect of social globalization on reducing child labor
decreases as social globalization increases. The log of per capita GDP is also
negatively and signicantly related to child labor, as expected. The economic
signicant of social globalization is quite high in column (1). As social globaliza-
tion now enters the equation in nonlinear form, the economic e¤ect will depend
on where in the distribution the e¤ect is evaluated. I choose to evaluate social
globalization at its mean minus one half its standard deviation to its mean plus
one half of its standard deviation. The result is a decrease in child labor by
approximately 10 percentage points (nearly two thirds of a standard deviation),
which is a large e¤ect.
Column (2) includes region dummy variables, which reduces the magnitude
of the coe¢ cient on social globalization, but does not impact the statistical
signicance. Unlike the regressions above, some regional dummies are now sig-
nicant, and the log of per capita GDP remains negative and signicant. In
column (3), the share of rural population, value added in agriculture and value
added in services are included in the regression. This further reduces the coef-
7 I could also use the log of social globalization, but this does not change the results quali-
tatively.
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cient on social globalization but does not a¤ect its statistical signicance. All
three of the additional variables have a positive and signicant e¤ect on child
labor. The variables for political rights and ILO convention 138 are included in
column (4) but are insignicant in both cases. Finally, educational expenditure
as a share of GDP is included in column (5) and is insignicant.
In all ve regressions, social globalization is negatively and signicantly re-
lated to child labor while the quadratic term is positive and signicant. Further,
value added in agriculture is signicant and positive in all regressions. These
results are qualitatively similar to the results reported in table 2 above. How-
ever, there are additional signicant variables in the regressions; the log of per
capita GDP is negative and signicant in all regressions, whereas the coe¢ cients
on the region dummy for sub-Saharan Africa, the share of rural population and
value added in services are all signicant and positive in all regressions. Given
that there are more signicant variables in the regressions in table 5, it is not
surprising that the economic signicance of social globalization is much lower in
these regression compared to the results in table 2; from column (3) onwards,
a one standard deviation increase in social globalization around the mean de-
creases child labor by approximately 3 percentage points, which is roughly one
fth of a standard deviation. Therefore, the results in table 5 seem to broadly
conrm the results in table 2; social globalization is consistently statistically
signicant. However, it is di¢ cult to ascertain whether the di¤erences in the
results, in terms of the economics e¤ect of social globalization and the number
of signicant variables, are driven by di¤erent sample sizes or the manner in
which the data is tted in the ILO data.
Another potential problem with the results in section 5.1 is that there may
be issues of endogeneity between social globalization and child labor, and log
per capita GDP and child labor. Table 6 reports the results of the robustness
checks for the endogeneity of these variables. The potential endogeneity of log
per capita GDP and child labor is addressed in Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006)
and Neumayer and de Soysa (2005) by using instrumental variables, namely
log per capita GDP and investment, both lagged by 15 years. I have access to
lagged values of log per capita GDP for most of the countries in the sample, but
the data for investment is missing in several cases, which signicantly reduces
the sample size.
<Table 6 about here>
In column (1), the OLS regression results are reported when social global-
ization, log per capita GDP, value added in agriculture and the region dummies
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are included as independent variables, and serves as the baseline. In column (2),
the results of the IV estimation where log of per capita GDP is instrumented
by log of GDP and investment lagged by 15 years each are presented. I fol-
low Neumayer and de Soysa (2005) in employing a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
to determine if IV estimation is necessary, and the results reveal that the null
hypothesis that the OLS estimates are consistent cannot be rejected. As the
e¤ect of per capita income on child labor is not the primary focus of this paper
and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not indicate the need for IV estimation,
I choose not to use the instrumental variable approach for log of per capita GDP
in the remaining regressions, in order to take advantage of the full sample size8 .
Most previous research has been interested in the e¤ects of economic glob-
alization on child labor and have often used trade volumes as the measure of
globalization. A common means of instrumenting for trade is to use the grav-
ity model of bilateral trade ows (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Frankel and Rose,
2002, 2005). This method cannot be applied to social globalization, however,
as bilateral data does not exist. Further, it is not as straightforward that social
globalization is strongly a¤ected by geography. Therefore, other instrumen-
tal variables are necessary. An appropriate instrumental variable needs to be
strongly correlated with social globalization (the endogenous variable) and un-
correlated with child labor (the dependent variable) once all other explanatory
variables are controlled for (Woodridge, 2002). Therefore, the challenge is to
nd variables that are strongly correlated with social globalization but that only
a¤ect child labor via social globalization. Two potential candidates for instru-
mental variables are the minimum distance to Brussels, New York or Tokyo and
English as an o¢ cial language. The minimum distance variable is not signi-
cant in explaining social globalization when the other explanatory variables are
accounted for (supporting the suspicion that geography is not a important de-
terminant of social globalization) and is therefore unsuitable as an instrumental
variable. English as an o¢ cial language is signicantly correlated with social
globalization and can potentially be useful as an instrumental variable. The
results are reported in column (3). The Kleibergen-Paap statistic indicates that
the instrumental variable is relatively weak, which risks leading to an inated
coe¢ cient on social globalization. Further, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test can-
not reject the null hypothesis that the OLS estimates are consistent9 . Therefore,
8Further, in the model developed in Appendix X it is contemporaneous income that inu-
ences the decision to send children to work or school.
9However, these results are weaker than in the case of national income
17
the results in column (3) are not necessarily an improvement on the results in
column (1).
Another potential solution is to use the same type of instrumental variable as
in the case of national income, i.e. social globalization lagged 15 years. The re-
sults of this IV estimation are reported in column (4). This instrument performs
much better according to the Kleibergen-Paap statistic, and results in a slightly
lower statistical signicance for social globalization as compared to the result
in column (1). The the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, however, can once again not
reject the null hypothesis that the OLS estimates are consistent. Finally, social
globalization lagged by one year is used instead of social globalization in column
(5). The result is that the coe¢ cient on social globalization is somewhat smaller
and less signicant than in column (1). With the exception of column (3), the
results in table 6 do not reveal signicant di¤erences in the statistical and eco-
nomic signicance of social globalization and seem to indicate that endogeneity
is not a substantial problem in the results reported in sub-sections 5.1 to 5.3.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to contribute to the existing cross-country
literature on the e¤ects of globalization on child labor by specically investigat-
ing the impact of social globalization on child labor. The results show that the
impact of social globalization on the number of economically active children on
average is consistently negative and signicant. This result holds even when a
number of control variables are added to the regressions, including the log of per
capita GDP and the value added in agriculture as a percentage of GDP. Further,
the signicant negative relationship between child labor and social globalization
holds when the relationship is analyzed using an older and larger data set, and
when using instrumental variables estimation techniques. Therefore, the results
support the hypothesis that social globalization does indeed have a real e¤ect on
the incidence of child labor that, in contrast to economic globalization, does not
appear to be driven by income e¤ects. However, it is not possible to distinguish
the channels through which this e¤ect works. Thus an area of future research
is to explore the relationship between social globalization and child labor at a
smaller unit of analysis.
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Appendix A
The simple theoretical model developed here is based on the model presented in
Bhalotra and Heady (2003), and is a two period model of a peasant household
where it is assumed that each household contains one parent and one child.
I maintain the assumption that the parent always works and that their labor
supply can be normalized to one. Further, the child does not bargain with
its parent, i.e. the parent decides how the childs time is allocated.10 In the
case where the child does not work, rst period household income, Y1, is simply
Y1 = wa1, whereas in the case where the child works, household income in the
rst period is given by Y1 = wa1 + wc1Lc1. In the previous equations, wa1 and
wc1 are wages paid to the adult and child respectively, while Lc1 is the labor
supplied by the child. The wages here do not necessarily have to be an explicit
wage; it may be the marginal product of own farm labor, for example.
In the second period the child has become an adult and may or may not
continue to live in the family household, but for simplicity it is assumed that
their income and consumption remain part of the household total. The childs
second period wage is a function of the rst period activity in which the child
participated, i.e. work or school. This allows for a dynamic e¤ect for the choice
of activity in the rst period. Second period household income is given by:
Y2 = wa2 + wc2 (Lc1; S)Lc2: (3)
The household can either save or borrow in the rst period, so that rst
period consumption is not bound by rst period income. Further, the household
is assumed to inherit some initial nancial wealth (which can be either positive
or negative) from period zero. First period net nancial wealth, !1, is thus
given by:
!1 = !0 + Y1  X1   C (S) (4)
where !0 is initial nancial wealth, C (S) is the direct cost of schooling (= 0 if
the child does not attend school) and X1 is rst period consumption (the price
10See Basu (1999) for an overview of models of child labor with intra-household bargaining.
The assumption that children do not bargain with their parents is quite reasonable, as the only
recourse a young child would have is to leave the household, which is not likely an attractive
alternative. Bhalotra and Heady point out that this option becomes even less attractive for
children who can expect to inherit the family farm.
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of which is normalized to unity). Second period net nancial wealth is given by:
!2 = Y2  X2 + !1 (1 + r) (5)
Simplifying this expression somewhat, we can express the corresponding second
period budget constraint as:
X2 = Y2 + !1 (1 + r) : (6)
The household now endeavors to maximize its utility function, which is as-
sumed to be time separable and is given by:
U = U1 (X;Lc1; S) + U2 (X2; Lc2) (7)
where   1 is the inverse of the time discount factor, , (i.e.  = 1 ). The
utility function is assumed to be a twice di¤erentiable positive concave func-
tion of consumption and leisure, so that the marginal utility of consumption
is positive while the marginal utility of labor and schooling is negative (i.e.
the marginal utility of leisure is positive). Thus, the parent is faced with the
following maximization problem:
max U subject to !1   !0   Y1 +X1 + C (S) = 0 and (8)
X2   wa2   wc2 (Lc1; S)Lc2   !1 (1 + r) = 0:
By setting up a Lagrangian function   with multipliers 1 and 2, one can
derive the rst order conditions relevant to the child labor/schooling decision:
@ 
@X1
=

@U1
@X1

  1 = 0 (9)
@ 
@X2
= 

@U2
@X2

  2 = 0 (10)
@ 
@Lc1
=

@U1
@Lc1

+ wcw11 + Lc2

@wc2
@Lc1

2  0 (11)
@ 
@S =
 
@U1
@S
   @C@S 1 + Lc2  @wc2@S 2  0: (12)
According to (11), the child will work if the rst period wage plus the value
of the increase in the second period wage due to wage work experience is equal
to the marginal disutility of wage labor, while (12) shows that the parent will
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send their child to school if the value of the increase in the second period wage
due to schooling minus the marginal cost of schooling is equal to the marginal
disutility of schooling. So how does social globalization potentially come into
the picture? One way is via
 
@U1
@S

and

@U1
@Lc1

, i.e. the marginal disutility of
schooling and child labor, by a¤ecting norms. Increased exposure to interna-
tional norms may cause households to place a higher intrinsic value on schooling,
which would lower the marginal disutility of schooling and make it more likely
that equation (12) holds with equality. Similarly, international norms could lead
households to hold a more negative view of child labor, which would increase
the marginal disutility of child labor and make it less likely that equation (11)
holds with equality. Social globalization could also have an impact on
 
@wc2
@S

,
i.e. the return to schooling, via access to a larger labor market or as a reection
of changes in skilled labor demand in the economy. This again would make
schooling a relatively more attractive option than child labor.
Appendix B
<Table B here>
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Figure 1: Economically active children and social globalization 
Source: World Bank (2011) and KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006). 
 
Figure 2: Economically active children in 1995 and social globalization 
Source: International Labour Organization (2000) and KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006).
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Table 1: Pair-wise correlation coefficients for child labor, social globalization, and selected control variables 
Full Sample 
Econ. Active 
Children 
Social 
Globalization 
Log 
pcGDP Rural pop 
 
Agriculture 
 
Services 
Political 
Rights C138 
Econ. Active Children 1.0000        
Social Globalization -0.6591 1.0000       
Log pcGDP -0.6295 0.8649 1.0000      
Rural pop 0.4398 -0.6249 -0.6787 1.0000     
Agriculture 0.6492 -0.7082 -0.8640 0.5423 1.0000   
Services -0.4754 0.6265 0.5389 0.2948 -0.5485 1.0000   
Political Rights 0.1990b) -0.4378 -0.3729 0.3383 0.2749a) -0.4510 1.0000  
C138 -0.0478c) 0.2034b) 0.1805c) -0.2019b) 0.1234c) 0.0383c) -0.0953c) 1.0000
Education Exp. -0.2775b) 0.3787 0.3079 -0.1771c) -0.2648a) 0.3470 -0.1619c) -0.2717a)
Note: All correlation coefficients are significant at <1% except: a) significant at <5%, b) significant at <10% and c) not significant. 
Table 2: Regression results for economically active children, all 
 Dependent Variable: Economically Active Children 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Social Glob -0.58*** -0.61*** -0.58** -0.61*** -0.58** 
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.24) 
Log pcGDP -5.04* -2.25 3.96 4.21 3.72 
 (2.97) (3.43) (5.11) (5.27) (5.63) 
Lac  -3.86 -2.49 -4.93 -5.03 
  (5.08) (5.61) (6.81) (7.53) 
Mena  -11.01 -7.51 -8.54 -8.25 
  (8.02) (7.24) (7.31) (7.86) 
Ssa  4.06 5.75 3.54 2.58 
  (6.48) (6.82) (6.95) (8.22) 
esea  -4.64 -1.82 -4.57 -4.96 
  (7.05) (6.55) (7.43) (8.09) 
sa  -7.22 -5.49 -9.10 -11.17 
  (10.78) (10.60) (11.85) (13.36) 
Rural pop   0.04 0.06 0.06 
   (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Agriculture   0.48* 0.49* 0.47 
   (0.26) (0.27) (0.29) 
Services   -0.00 -0.03 -0.04 
   (0.17) (0.19) (0.21) 
Political Rights    -0.77 -0.94 
    (1.41) (1.45) 
C138    -1.36 -3.15 
    (4.65) (5.71) 
Education Exp.     -0.84 
     (1.38) 
N 81 81 76 75 73 
R-squared 0.5346 0.5777 0.5996 0.6033 0.6085 
Note: Robust standard errors are given in (). Estimated intercepts and dummy variables for survey 
year are omitted from the table. The superscripts ***/**/* indicate a p-value less than 
0.01/0.05/0.10, respectively. 
Table 3: Regression results for economically active boys and economically active girls 
Dependent 
Variable: Economically Active Boys Economically Active Girls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Social Glob -0.58*** -0.62*** -0.64** -0.67*** -0.66** -0.58*** -0.60*** -0.52** -0.55** -0.50** 
 (0.20) (0.23) (0.25) (0.23) (0.25) (0.20) (0.21) (0.25) (0.23) (0.25) 
Log pcGDP -5.13* -2.63 4.06 4.41 3.88 -4.96* -1.89 3.83 3.96 3.50 
 (3.03) (3.56) (5.18) (5.27) (5.63) (2.96) (3.37) (5.15) (5.38) (5.73) 
lac  -2.40 -1.12 -4.24 -4.24  -5.29 -3.85 -5.57 -5.75 
  (5.33) (5.82) (7.07) (7.84)  (5.02) (5.60) (6.74) (7.40) 
mena  -10.44 -7.00 -8.39 -7.48  -11.59 -8.03 -8.65 -8.99 
  (7.97) (7.31) (7.38) (8.01)  (8.16) (7.24) (7.34) (7.81) 
ssa  3.51 4.77 1.95 0.73  4.62 6.73 5.20 4.51 
  (6.54) (6.85) (6.88) (8.27)  (6.53) (6.87) (7.12) (8.24) 
esea  -5.55 -3.02 -6.52 -7.08  -3.72 -0.62 -2.56 -2.78 
  (7.19) (6.62) (7.48) (8.24)  (7.05) (6.64) (7.56) (8.13) 
sa  -8.26 -7.56 -12.14 -14.54  -6.20 -3.45 -6.02 -7.74 
  (10.38) (10.16) (11.44) (13.12)  (11.45) (11.32) (12.60) (13.96) 
Rural pop   0.07 0.09 0.10   0.02 0.03 0.03 
   (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)   (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Agriculture   0.50* 0.51* 0.49*   0.46* 0.46 0.45 
   (0.25) (0.27) (0.29)   (0.26) (0.29) (0.31) 
Services   0.08 0.05 0.03   -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 
   (0.17) (0.19) (0.21)   (0.17) (0.19) (0.22) 
Political Rights    -0.96 -1.15    -0.59 -0.72 
    (1.43) (1.47)    (1.43) (1.46) 
C138    -1.79 -3.56    -0.85 -2.67 
    (4.63) (5.76)    (4.75) (5.74) 
Education Exp.     -0.72     -0.96 
     (1.35)     (1.42) 
N 81 81 76 75 73 81 81 76 75 73 
R-squared 0.5340 0.5742 0.5952 0.6033 0.6083 0.5260 0.5725 0.5963 0.5965 0.6023 
Note: Robust standard errors are given in (). Estimated intercepts and dummy variables for survey year are omitted from the table. The superscripts ***/**/* indicate a p-value 
less than 0.01/0.05/0.10, respectively 
 
Table 4: Regression results for economically active children, work only 
 Dependent Variable: Economically Active Children, Work Only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Social Glob -0.39*** -0.39** -0.42** -0.45*** -0.42** 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) 
Log pcGDP -3.25 -1.44 3.82 3.56 3.22 
 (2.01) (2.43) (2.81) (2.95) (3.23) 
lac  -0.47 1.18 -0.54 -1.97 
  (3.56) (3.54) (3.84) (3.94) 
mena  3.84 6.52 6.11 4.88 
  (4.48) (4.55) (4.51) (4.84) 
ssa  6.01* 6.97** 5.14 3.36 
  (3.22) (3.02) (3.22) (3.52) 
esea  -3.02 -0.90 -3.06 -4.27 
  (2.94) (3.00) (3.37) (3.12) 
sa  -3.81 -3.07 -6.27 -9.73 
  (5.38) (6.07) (6.77) (7.49) 
Rural pop   0.04 0.05 0.05 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Agriculture   0.42** 0.40** 0.39* 
   (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
Services   0.10 0.07 0.10 
   (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) 
Political Rights    -0.78 -0.95 
    (0.69) (0.72) 
C138    -1.32 -3.65 
    (3.04) (3.79) 
Education Exp.     -1.45* 
     (0.81) 
N 81 81 76 75 73 
R-squared 0.4833 0.5425 0.6029 0.6092 0.6323 
Note: Robust standard errors are given in (). Estimated intercepts and dummy variables for survey 
year are omitted from the table. The superscripts ***/**/* indicate a p-value less than 
0.01/0.05/0.10, respectively 
 
 
Table 5: Regression results for economically active children, 1995 
 Dependent Variable: Economically Active Children 1995 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Social Glob -1.41*** -0.86*** -0.70*** -0.70*** -0.78*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) 
(Social Glob)2 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log pcGDP -3.87** -4.14*** -2.98** -2.96** -2.20* 
 (1.54) (1.18) (1.22) (1.23) (1.25) 
Lac  -3.84 -0.94 -1.28 -0.57 
  (5.53) (5.48) (5.63) (5.85) 
Mena  -9.17* -4.65 -5.73 -5.16 
  (5.42) (5.28) (5.55) (6.02) 
Ssa  9.91* 10.92** 10.55** 11.85** 
  (5.26) (5.16) (5.32) (5.70) 
Esea  -5.89 -3.65 -4.06 -4.98 
  (5.65) (5.59) (5.73) (5.93) 
Eeandca  -11.16** -8.59 -9.27 -7.75 
  (5.53) (5.68) (5.80) (6.22) 
Rural pop   0.12** 0.12** 0.10* 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Agriculture   0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Services   0.19** 0.20** 0.20** 
   (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Political Rights    0.26 0.56 
    (0.49) (0.54) 
C138    0.29 0.26 
    (1.37) (1.39) 
Education Exp.     -0.72 
     (0.47) 
N 119 119 116 116 107 
R-squared 0.5718 0.7873 0.8204 0.8211 0.8281 
Note: Robust standard errors are given in (). Estimated intercepts are omitted from the table. The 
superscripts ***/**/* indicate a p-value less than 0.01/0.05/0.10, respectively. 
Table 6: Regression results for economically active children, robustness checks 
 Dependent Variable: Economically Active Children 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Social Glob -0.58*** -0.56*** -1.60** -0.60***  
 (0.21) (0.17) (0.70) (0.23)  
(Social Glob)t-1     -0.55** 
     (0.22) 
Log pcGDP 3.39 5.23 12.97 3.64 2.97 
 (4.85) (5.22) (8.06) (4.61) (4.90) 
Agriculture 0.48* 0.61** 0.42 0.47** 0.47* 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.27) (0.22) (0.26) 
Lac -2.70 -5.77 -5.90 -2.79 -2.16 
 (5.64) (4.39) (5.73) (5.04) (5.71) 
mena -7.58 -12.57** -14.19 -7.75 -7.52 
 (7.03) (6.01) (9.43) (6.28) (7.10) 
ssa 6.04 3.11 -2.34 5.82 6.60 
 (6.49) (6.87) (9.67) (5.59) (6.45) 
esea -1.50 -8.77* -10.72 -1.74 -0.88 
 (6.53) (4.94) (10.01) (5.68) (6.48) 
sa -4.63 -3.25 -16.49 -4.95 -5.10 
 (9.90) (11.21) (12.14) (8.85) (9.92) 
N 76 63 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.5987 0.6578 0.4437 0.5985 0.5931 
      
IV Log pcGDP No Yes No No No 
IV Social Glob No No Yes Yes No 
      
Durbin-Wu-  0.41 2.24 0.02  
Hausman test  (0.5264) (0. 1397) (0.8918)  
Hansen J 
statistic  0.332    
  (0.5643)    
Kleibergen-Paap   51.136 7.073 67.083  
statistic      
Note: Robust standard errors are given in (). Estimated intercepts and dummy variables for survey 
year are omitted from the table. The superscripts ***/**/* indicate a p-value less than 
0.01/0.05/0.10, respectively 
Table A: The KOF Index of Globalization: Social globalization 
i) Data on personal contacts 
 Outgoing telephone traffic 
 Transfers (percent of GDP) 
 International tourism 
 Foreign population (percent of total population) 
 
ii) Data on information flows 
 Internet hosts (per 1000 people) 
 Internet users (per 1000 people) 
 Cable television (per 1000 people) 
 Trade in newspapers (percent of GDP) 
 Radios (per 1000 people) 
 
iii) Data on cultural proximity 
 Number of McDonald's restaurants (per capita) 
 Number of IKEA outlets (per capita) 
 Trade in books (percent of GDP) 
Source: Dreher, 2006. 
 
